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INTRODUCTION

As Mark Twain stated some time ago, "Whiskey is for drinking, water is for
fighting over." Mr. Twain's words cannot be applied anywhere more directly than to the
once dry and dusty panhandle State of Oklahoma. 2 Despite recent droughts, had it not
been for Senator Robert S. Kerr, Oklahoma would today be experiencing many more
serious battles over water resources.3 Southeastern Oklahoma, now lush with an
abundance of lakes, has recently become the focal point of litigation over the right to
transfer that water to places outside of the region. 4 In Oklahoma, the ongoing disputes
over the southeastern portion of the state's water have been witnessed through the news, 5
but even those outside the state are becoming increasingly aware of the fight for water. 6
In August of 2011, the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations filed a lawsuit against the
State of Oklahoma to protect their rights to the water in Sardis Reservoir. 7 The outcome
of this current litigation between the Tribal Nations and the State of Oklahoma could
potentially set new precedent in state-tribal water rights disputes in Oklahoma and
around the country. 8 If the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations successfully obtain either
full or substantial rights to the waters in Sardis Reservoir, other federally-recognized
tribes that have water rights not yet formally recognized may have the footing needed to
seek legal protection of those rights. 9 Conversely, if the State of Oklahoma wins this
case against the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations, tribal water rights in Oklahoma could
be severely impaired and the future social and economic health of all the tribes in the
state could be jeopardized, beginning with the Chickasaw and Choctaw. 10
The purpose of this article is to use previous court rulings to sketch an outline that
forecasts the decision of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma ("Western District Court") in Chickasaw Nation v. Fallin.11 This case
1. Thomas L. Sansonetti & Sylvia Quast, Not Just a Western Issue Anymore: Water Disputes in the
Eastern United States, 34 CUMB. L. REV. 185, 185 (2003) (demonstrating use of the widely quoted phrase;
however, while this quote is most often attributed to Mark Twain, it has not been authenticated as such).
2. Journal Record Staff, Special Report: 12[who?] Oklahoma Water Wars, THE JOURNAL REC. (June 28,
2010), available at http://joumalrecord.com/2010/06/28/oklahoma-water-wars.
3.

CHARLES ROBERT GoINs & DANIEL GOBLE, HISTORICAL ATLAS OF OKLAHOMA 217 (4th ed. 2006).

Robert S. Kerr was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1948 and given a post on an inconspicuous senate
subcommittee in charge of approving federal water projects. Id. While on the subcommittee, Senator Kerr
directed hundreds of millions of dollars into Oklahoma to be put towards a multitude of water projects. Id.
Senator Kerr "seemed to be set on putting a dam on every river and creek the state had." Id.
4. See Tarrant Reg'1 Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 656 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. granted80 U.S.L.W.
3453 (U.S. Jan. 4, 2013) (No. 11-889); see also Complaint, Chickasaw Nation v. Fallin, 2011 WL 3629363
(W.D. Okla. Aug. 18, 2011) (No. CV-I 1-927-C) [hereinafter Chickasaw Nation Complaint]. The plaintiffs
that filed this suit, the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations, have since filed an amended complaint that contains
additional claims against the defendants. The additional claims contained in the amended complaint are not
relevant to this article's discussion, therefore this article will refer to and cite the original filed complaint.
5. Journal Record Staff, supranote 2.
6. Felicity Barringer, Precious Waters: Indians Join Fight for an Oklahoma Lake's Flow, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 12, 2011), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9CO1E5DB1038F93A25757COA9679D8B63
&pagewanted=all.
7. See Chickasaw Nation Complaint, supra note 4.
8. Barringer, supranote 6.
9. Id.
10. Chickasaw Nation Complaint, supranote 4, at para. 6.
11. Id.
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involves a dispute over the rights to the waters being stored in the Sardis Reservoir, a
body of water referred to as Sardis Lake, in Southeastern Oklahoma.12 Section II of this
article presents a summary of information relating to treaties, and the interpretation
thereof, between the federal government and/or the states and Tribal Nations, beginning
with the Canons of Construction. 13 Section III examines three cases, all of which help to
14
establish the legal concept of the reserved water right. Section IV considers two
Oklahoma cases, each of which has a significant bearing on the issue in Chickasaw
Nation v. Fallin.15 Section V describes the background history of the Sardis Reservoir,
which holds the water in dispute, and then lays out the Tribal Nations' claims to the
rights to that water.16 Section VI is an application of the legal principles and court
decisions from the preceding sections to Chickasaw Nation v. Fallin, and an analysis of
17
their likely impact on the Western District Court's ruling. Section VII concludes the
article with a summary of the arguments in favor of the Tribes and makes the prediction
that the Western District Court will find no reasonable choice but to rule in favor of the
Tribal Nations and uphold their rights to the water in the Sardis Reservoir.
II.

TREATIES WITH THE TRIBAL NATIONS

The standards and methods for interpreting federal Indian law vary greatly from
those used to interpret other bodies of law in the United States.18 The manner in which
the judiciary has interpreted treaties between the United States and Tribal Nations in the
past - especially the authority of treaties upheld by the Supreme Court - is of
paramount importance to the Western District Court's ruling in Chickasaw Nation v.
Fallin.19
A.

The Canons of Construction

The Indian Canons of Construction are generally held rules for interpreting
20
treaties, agreements, and other instruments of law as they relate to Tribal Nations.
There are four basic canons for interpreting treaties between the United States and Tribal
Nations: (1) treaties should be construed in a light most favorable to the Tribal Nations,
(2) ambiguities in the language of the treaties should be resolved in favor of the Tribal
Nations, (3) treaties should be interpreted as the Tribal Nations would have understood
them at the time of drafting, and (4) the Tribal Nation's sovereignty and rights to

12. Id.
13. FELIx S. COHEN, COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 119 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds.,
2005).
14. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Winters v.
United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
15. Choctaw Nation v. United States, 397 U.S. 620 (1970); Tarrant Reg'I Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 656
F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2011); Chickasaw Nation Complaint, supra note 4.
16. See Chickasaw Nation Complaint, supra note 4.
17. See infra notes 240-75 and accompanying text.
18. See COHEN, supranote 13, at 119.
19. See Chickasaw Nation Complaint, supra note 4.
20. COHEN, supranote 13, at 119-20.
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property are to be preserved unless Congress clearly and unambiguously intended the
contrary.2 1
B.

The Power and Purposeof the Indian Treaty

Treaties with Tribal Nations rank high as authority - second only to the U.S.
Constitution - and are considered "the supreme law of the land." 2 2 Article II of the U.S.
Constitution expressly gives the President the power to negotiate treaties, which are then
subject to Senate ratification.23 The drafters included this provision to enable the
President to negotiate with foreign countries; however, it has also provided the basis for
federal Indian law and established federal authority over Indian affairs. 2 4 In nearly all
instances when the President signed a treaty with an Indian Tribe, the treaty did not
actually give the Tribe any property or sovereignty.25 Instead, the treaty formed an
agreement between the Indian Tribe and the federal government whereby the Tribe
ceded its rights to the property to the federal government, which in return reserved those
rights on the Tribe's behalf.26
The origination of treaties with Tribal Nations in the western portion of the United
States - including what is now the State of Oklahoma - spawned from the Louisiana
Purchase.27 The Louisiana Purchase did not actually buy the United States title to the
large tract of land west of the Mississippi, but rather gave the United States the right to
negotiate for title with the Tribal Nations that occupied the lands.28 Thus, after the
United States completed the Louisiana Purchase, it began to enter into treaties with the
Tribal Nations to relocate them and make room for the western expansion of settlers. 29
The purpose of these treaties was to help advance the expansion and growth of the
United States westward, while, in the process, giving the Tribal Nations new and
permanent homelands wherein they could continue their ways of life without disturbing
the progress of the United States.30 The Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations, along with
each of the other Five Civilized Tribes 31 have a unique type of treaty in comparison to
21. Id. at 119-20 (citations omitted).
22. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 519 (1832) ("The very term 'nation,' so generally applied to
them, means 'a people distinct from others.' The constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as
those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the
Indian nations, and, consequently, admits their rank among those powers who are capable of making treaties.
The words 'treaty' and 'nation' are words of our own language, selected in our diplomatic and legislative
proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and well understood meaning. We have applied them to
Indians, as we have applied them to the other nations of the earth. They are applied to all in the same sense.").
23. U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
24. COHEN, supra note 13, at 393.
25. Id. at 394.
26. Id.
27. Taiawagi Helton, Comment, Indian Reserved Water Rights in the Dual-System State of Oklahoma, 33
TULSA L.J. 979, 991 (1998).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 991-92.
31. Id. at 991 n.136. The Five Civilized Tribes consist of the Cherokees, Chickasaws, Choctaws, Creeks,
and Seminoles. The United States signed a treaty with each of the tribes that granted them title to their treaty
lands in fee simple, which was far greater than the standard grant of land to the rest of the Indian Tribes. The
relevant treaties include: the Treaty with the Cherokee, Dec. 29, 1935, U.S.-Cherokee Nation, 7 Stat. 478
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almost all the other Tribes in the country.32 The treaties are unique because the United
States gave the Five Civilized Tribes patents to their treaty lands, which specifically
conveyed the land in fee simple.33 These favorable conveyances have given the Five
Civilized Tribes much more authority over their treaty property than the more standard
treaties give other Tribal Nations. 34 The fee simple title accords these tribes the most
35
complete ownership interest in real property recognized in this country. The fact that it
was conveyed through a treaty with the United States - authoritatively second only to
36
the U.S. Constitution - renders it as powerful as any other federal law.
While the purpose of the treaties was to promote the westward expansion agenda,
the purpose of reserving land through treaties was, ostensibly, to provide the Tribes with
permanent homelands, wherein they could continue to live and prosper as a sovereign
nation. 37 The treaties were meant to ensure and protect the Tribal Nations' complete and
total freedom to govern themselves and their property and to have authority over their
lands and everything thereon. 38 When the United States entered into the treaty
agreements with the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations, the treaties were given the power
of the supreme law of the land, and the promises within them were to be upheld and
protected as such.3 9
C.

The EqualFooting Doctrine

The Northwest Territorial Ordinance of 1778 is one of the earliest known
40
acknowledgements of the Equal Footing Doctrine. This document was created as a
means to establish territories in the Atlantic Northeast and declared that, "such state shall
be admitted, by its delegates, into the Congress of the United States, on an equal footing
41
Not long after the Northwest
with the original states, in all respects whatever."
Territorial Ordinance of 1778, settlers began moving west in large numbers as the nation
expanded rapidly in the late 1800s and early 1900s, to what were known as
"territories."42 As each territory became adequately populated, Congress enabled the
[hereinafter Treaty of New Echota]; Treaty with the Creeks, Feb. 14, 1833, U.S.-Creek Nation, 7 Stat. 417;
Treaty with the Seminole, May 9, 1832, U.S.-Seminole Indians, 7 Stat. 368; Treaty with the Choctaw, Sept. 27,
1830, U.S.-Choctaw Nation, 7 Stat. 333 [hereinafter Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek].
32. Helton, supra note 27, at 991.
33. See, e.g., Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, supra note 31.
34. Helton, supranote 27, at 991 n.136.
35. 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estates § 13 ("A 'fee-simple title' is a freehold estate of inheritance absolute and
unqualified and stands at the head of estates as highest in dignity and the most ample in extent; every other
kind of estate may be derived from it and may be merged into it. 'Fee simple absolute' and 'fee simple'
represent the entire and absolute interest and property in the land. No one can have a greater interest. The
holder of a fee simple holds property clear of any condition, limitation, or restriction. There can be only one
estate in fee simple to a particular tract of land.").
36. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 519 (1832).
37. See Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, supra note 31.
38. Id.
39. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 519.
40. ORDINANCE OF 1787: THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT, art. 5, reprinted in 1 UNITED
STATES CODE, at XLITI-LXXIII (Office of the Law Revision Counsel of the House of Representatives ed.,
2006).
41. Id.
42. Helton, supra note 27, at 991-92.
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settlers to create new states to be entered into the Union on "equal footing" with the
original states. 4 3 The Oklahoma Enabling Act produced the means for the then
Oklahoma Territory to be admitted to the Union as the State of Oklahoma in the year
1907.44 As this article demonstrates, it is not uncommon for parties to attempt to rely on
the Equal Footing Doctrine when faced with Tribal claims for the protection of lands
granted to them by treaty. 45 However, the cases discussed provide the Western District
Court in Chickasaw Nation v. Fallin ample guidance to reasonably conclude that the
Equal Footing Doctrine did not pass to Oklahoma the title to the Tribal Nations' water
upon Oklahoma's admission to the Union. 46
D.

A Brief Overview of the Policy History of Treaties

The United States and Congress were very amiable towards the Tribal Nations in
the early stages of forming the nation, largely due to the fact that the struggle to gain
independence from Great Britain was taking precedence at the time; the last thing lawmakers needed was added hostility from the Tribal Nations. 47 Once the British withdrew
from the continent, however, the United States shifted its attitude towards the Tribes and
implemented a more aggressive and one-sided approach in negotiating with them resulting most often in Tribal disadvantage.48 In addition to the language barrier the
Tribes faced when negotiating treaties with the United States, too often the negotiations
were fraught with threats, bribery, and fraud. 4 9 This practice of aggressive and
manipulative treaty negotiation took place for decades, as the United States' primary
objective was the western expansion of settlers and the procurement of land and
resources to further that effect. 50
History demonstrates that the United States was often quick to breach its treaty
promises with Tribal Nations in order to further western expansion policy; it could even
be argued that breaching treaties was one of the most effective policies employed by the
federal government in its efforts to expand westward across the continent. 5 1 The
members of the Five Civilized Tribes,52 which include the Tribal Nations in Chickasaw
Nation v. Fallin, endured numerous treaties, renegotiations, and relocations before they
43. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. I (granting Congress the sole power to admit states, not the power to create
states).

44. See Oklahoma Enabling Act, 34 Stat. 267 (1906).
45.

Choctaw Nation v. United States, 397 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1970).

46. See id.
47. See Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, JudicialReview of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As long
as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth" - How Long a Time is That? 63 CALIF. L. REv. 601, 609
(1975).
48. Id. at 610.
49. Id. at 610-11.
50. Id. at 611.
5 1. Id. ("[I]n one case a treaty was respected for only [twelve] days before it was violated by the
government negotiator.").
52. These five tribes became known as the Five Civilized Tribes due to their remarkably rapid settlement in
terms of social and political development after they were forced to endure the "Trail of Tears" in their removal
to the Oklahoma Territory. See ANGIE DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN: THE BETRAYAL OF THE FIvE

CIVILIZED TRIBES 4-5 (1973). The name was given in order to distinguish them from the more undomesticated
Tribes in the region. Id at 5.
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were finally able to settle and remain on the lands to which they currently hold title
today. 53
Since the 1830 signing of the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, the judicial branch
of the U.S. government has been the most active and consistent participant in
maintaining the validity of treaties with the Tribal Nations. 54 This policy of upholding
treaties between the United States and Tribal Nations is evidenced in the prudential
Indian law Canons of Construction, which U.S. courts have repeatedly utilized when
deciding cases involving treaty rights. 55 The courts have made it common practice to
consider additional factors outside of treaties, such as the events leading up to the treaty,
when determining a treaty's meaning and authority.56 These factors include other
principals of related law and the circumstances surrounding the making of the treaty. 57
As early as the 1908 decision in Winters v. United States, the Court has made certain to
strongly consider the notions of fairness in light of the treatment of the Tribal Nations
before and at the time a treaty was entered into. 58
In the 1980s, under President Ronald Reagan, a shift in policy began to occur.59
The Reagan administration was concerned with the frequency and amount of litigation
that was taking place between Tribal Nations and states. 60 Its greatest concern, however,
was the amount of time and money it was taking to resolve the disputes in court.61
Specifically with regard to water rights cases involving Tribal Nations, the Reagan
administration in 1982 expressed its policy position as anti-litigation and instead in
support of negotiating settlements with Tribal Nations.62 The policy of negotiating
amicably rather than litigating adversarially with the Tribes might simply seem like an
attempt to save money by avoiding costly and lengthy court proceedings to resolve
disputes over water.63 There is convincing evidence, however, demonstrating that
despite avoiding litigation, since the settlement policy has been in place the amount of
spending on Tribal Nation water development and related federal programs has actually
increased.64 This increase in spending on development lends credibility to the idea that

53. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 622-28 (1970). The Supreme Court provided an excellent
and very thorough history of the succession of treaties that took place between the Five Civilized Tribes and
the United States. Id. In the recounting of each treaty, the Court seemed to make special note of when the
United States breached a particular treaty. Id. The Court made statements such as, "[oince again, the United
States assured the Indians that they would not be forced to move," and "again due in large part to pressure from
settlers . . . Congress acted to change the arrangement." Id. at 626-27.
54.

KIRKE KICKINGBIRD ET AL., INDIAN TREATIES 31 (1980).

55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 31-32.
Id. at 31-33.
Id. at 32.
See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).

59.

DANIEL MCCOOL, NATIVE WATERS: CONTEMPORARY INDIAN WATER SETTLEMENTS AND THE SECOND

TREATY ERA 46-48 (2002).

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 46-47.
Id.
Id. at 47 ("In 1982 the Reagan administration began to actively encourage tribes to negotiate.").
Id. at 46-56.
Id. at 45-56.
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perhaps the federal government has become more concerned with protecting the Tribal
Nations and upholding its agreements with them. 6 5
Many people believe that Tribal Nation water rights, along with a multitude of
other Tribal rights, are issues of justice and obligation. 66 The executive branch of the
federal government, responsible for enforcing the treaty agreements made with the Tribal
Nations, along with many private business interests, constituted a strong opposition to
protecting Tribal rights throughout the past. 67 As this article discusses, the judicial
branch, on the other hand, has seemingly been an avid proponent of upholding treaties
and agreements and protecting the rights of the Tribal Nations.68 This article examines
several cases that lend credence to the proposition that the policy of the judiciary has
consistently been to recognize and uphold the rights granted to Tribal Nations in their
treaties with the United States. 69
E.

The Treaty ofDancingRabbit Creek

The Tribal Nations in Chickasaw Nation v. Fallin assert their rights to the waters
in Sardis Reservoir under the power and provisions of the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit
Creek, entered into by the Tribes with the U.S. federal government in 1830.70 The Treaty
provided the agreement reached between the Choctaw Nation and the United States
regarding the lands that the United States reserved and granted to the Tribal Nation for
the purposes of providing the Choctaws a homeland. 7 1 Article Two of the Treaty gives
rather precise geographical descriptions of the boundaries of the Choctaw's reserved
lands and specifies that the land shall be "conveyed . . . in fee simple to them and their
decedents, to insure them while they shall exist as a nation and live on it." 72
The Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek also contains specific language guaranteeing
the Choctaw Nation the lawful right to tribal self-governance and jurisdiction over all
people and property outlined in the Treaty.7 3 Article Four of the Treaty of Dancing
Rabbit Creek states:
The Government and people of the United States are hereby obliged to secure to
the said Choctaw Nation of Red People the jurisdiction and government of all the
persons and property that may be within their limits west, so that no Territory or
State shall ever have a right to pass laws for the government of the Choctaw
Nation and their descendants; and that no part of the land granted them shall ever
be embraced in any Territory or State; but the U.S. shall forever secure said
Choctaw Nation from, and against, all laws except such as from time to time may
65. Id. at 54.
66. Id. at 50.
67. See DEBO, supra note 52, at 318-24.
68. See infra footnotes 85-166 and accompanying text.
69. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963);
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
70. Chickasaw Nation Complaint, supra note 4, at para. 1; see also Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, supra
note 31, at art. 2.
71. Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, supra note 31, at art. 2.
72. Id.
73. See id. at art. 4.
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38 1

be enacted in their own National Councils, not inconsistent with the Constitution,
Treaties, and the Laws of the United States; and except such as may, and which
have been enacted by Congress, to the extent that Congress under the Constitution
74
are required to exercise a legislation over Indian Affairs.
The Chickasaw Nation is implicated in the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek under
a separate treaty - the Treaty of Doaksville. 75 By signing this treaty, the Chickasaw
76
The "Chickasaw
Nation obtained what was to be termed a "Chickasaw District."
the previously
of
government
the
under
and
boundaries
the
District" was within
established Choctaw Nation lands, and "guarantied [sic] rights of homeland ownership
and occupancy." 77 Except for the right to dispose of the lands - a right held in common
by both the Choctaw and the Chickasaw Nations - the Treaty of Doaksville guaranteed
the Chickasaw Nation the same rights and sovereignty the Choctaw Nation had under the
78
Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek. It is the reason the Tribal Nations in Chickasaw
Nation v. Fallin jointly bring this action under the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek.79
The Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek was a development of the United States'
80
particularly unique handling of matters with the Five Civilized Tribes. The United
States made special agreements with the Five Civilized Tribes for their several and
respective relocations, beginning with the Cherokee's signing of the first removal treaty
in 1817.81 In these treaties, including the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, the United
States granted federal land patents to the Tribes82 describing the property conveyed as
permanent homeland.83 The Five Tribes Doctrine promulgates the notion that these
permanent homelands carry with them all the rights to the water, not just the water
84
necessary to fulfill the purpose of the treaty lands.
III.

THE ESTABLISHMENT AND EXPANSION OF THE INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHT

Reserved water rights are a combination of the riparian and prior appropriation
systems of obtaining rights to water.85 Like a riparian water right, a reserved water right

74. Id
75. See Treaty with the Choctaw and Chickasaw, Jan. 17, 1837, U.S.-Choctaw Nation-Chickasaw Nation,
11 Stat. 573 [hereinafter Treaty of Doaksville].
76. Id. at art. I ("It is agreed by the Choctaws that the Chickasaws shall have the privilege of forming a
district within the limits of their country, to be held on the same terms that the Choctaws now hold it, except
the right of disposing of it, (which is held in common with the Choctaws and Chickasaws) to be called the
Chickasaw district of the Choctaw Nation . . . .").
77. Chickasaw Nation Complaint, supranote 4, at para. 25; see Treaty of Doaksville, supra note 75.
78. Treaty of Doaksville, supranote 75.
79. See id.; see also Treaty of Dancing Rabbit, supra note 31; Chickasaw Nation Complaint, supra note 4,
at para. 25.
80. But see Helton, supra note 27, at 991 n.136 (including the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek as one of
several treaties, suggesting it is perhaps less than unique).
81. Id.
82. See generally Jennifer E. Pelphrey, Note, Oklahoma's State/Tribal Water Compact: Three Cheers for
Compromise, 29 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 127 (2005).
83. See Helton, supra note 27, at 993.
84. Id at 994-95.
85. Id at 990; see generally DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW INANUTSHELL (4th ed. 2009) (providing an
explanation of the prior appropriation and riparian systems of water rights).
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is attached to the land and originates with the ownership of the land.86 Just like a riparian
water right, a reserved water right cannot be diminished or relinquished through
nonuse. A reserved water right, on the other hand, is also like an appropriated water
right in that a reserved water right is quantifiable and does not diminish during water
shortages when other junior appropriators also need water. Diversion and beneficial
use are not elements needed to establish a reserved water right.89 Rather, a reserved
water right is established when the federal government reserves lands that require water
in order to be made useful. 90 The cases in this section discuss and demonstrate the
reserved water right as it has been applied to reserved Tribal Nation treaty lands, as well
as how it has been generally expanded to carry out Congress' intent and to meet the
needs ofjustice. 9 1
A.

Winters v. United States: The EstablishmentofReserved Indian Water Rights

The Winters case established that Indian Tribes in fact have reserved water rights
attached to their federally reserved lands.92 The ruling in the Winters case, which
evolved into what has long been termed the "Winters doctrine," holds that when the
federal government reserves lands for tribal purposes, it also, by implication, reserves
appurtenant waters to the extent necessary to achieve the purposes intended by the
reservation.93 The Winters case has a substantial effect in almost any litigation seeking to
establish the water rights of Tribal Nations, as it was the first decision declaring the
reserved Indian water right. 94
In Winters, the United States brought a lawsuit against the defendants to enjoin
them and any other party from constructing a dam or otherwise maintaining a structure
or facility that would prevent waters from naturally flowing to federally-reserved Indian
lands. 9 5 The Court recognized that the reserved lands, which were occupied by the
Indians and reserved by way of a treaty with the federal government, carried with them
numerous and certain rights.96 The Court noted that the reservation was once part of a
much larger tract of land that the Indians had, at one time, a right to occupy and use. 97
According to the facts of the Winters case, the Tribal Nations - referred to simply as
"Indians" at that time - wanted to become more of a civilized people and, in
86. Helton, supra note 27, at 990.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 990-91.
90. Id. at 991.
91. See generally Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546
(1963); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
92. See Winters, 207 U.S. 564.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id at 565. The United States prevailed at the district court level with the court granting an interlocutory
order, enjoining the defendants from interfering with the water flowing onto Indian Reservation land. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order in Winters v. UnitedStates, 148 F. 684 (9th
Cir. 1906). The case cited and discussed here is the defendant, Winters, arguing the case to the Supreme Court.
96. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576.
97. See id.
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furtherance of this desire, agreed to change their living conditions and reside on a much
smaller tract of land. 98 The defendants contended that when the Indians agreed to reduce
their area of occupation, they also relinquished their rights to their command over the
lands and the waters contained thereon because they were not savvy enough to express
their rights in the agreement. 99 The Court firmly struck down the defendant's contention,
reasoning that the Indians, once having commanded all the beneficial use of the lands
and the waters - whether for hunting, grazing, or agriculture - would not have
intended to "reduce the area of their occupation and give up the waters which made it
valuable or adequate." 10 0
In examining the events that led up to the signing of the treaty and interpreting the
language of the treaty, the Court determined that its purpose was to provide the Tribal
Nations with a permanent homeland where they could prosper as a "pastoral and
civilized people." 10 1 The Court ruled in favor of the Tribal Nations, holding that they
were, in fact, entitled to the water on their federally reserved treaty land, as entitlement
to a resource such as water was inferred by the agreement and served to "support the
purpose of the [treaty]."102 Thus, the Indian reserved water right was bom. 103
The Winters court promulgated a doctrine that has been cited to in countless tribal
water rights cases and secondary sources since its decree. 104 The Winters doctrine sets
what should be regarded as the standard for determining the minimum water rights that a
Tribal Nation possesses.105 Winters clearly states that Tribal Nations have a right to the
amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of their reservation, but since the ruling
in the Winters case, the Court has been willing to examine more closely the purposes of
reservations - both Indian and non-Indian - and what degree of right to water justly
fulfills those purposes.106
B.

Arizona v. California: Not Only Enough Water to Fulfill the Purposesof Today, but
Enough to Fulfill the Purposes ofForever

The Supreme Court expanded the Winters doctrine in 1963, nearly fifty years after
it made its ruling in the Winters case.107 The case was Arizona v. California,which was
a legal dispute "over how much water each State [and each Tribe of Indians had] a legal
right to use out of the waters of the Colorado River and its tributaries."10 8 The Court's
98. Id. It was the Government's policy at the time to attempt to shift the Indians from a "nomadic and
uncivilized people" into a more "pastoral and civilized people." Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id at 576-77.
103. Id
104. See Citing References, WESTLAW, https://a.next.westlaw.com/Relatedlnforma
tion/lb91 8b5279cb811 d9bc61beebb95be672/CitingReferences.html?originationContext=documentTab&transit
ionType=CitingReferences&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)&docSource=00c718108aO34eaOalcd9c4c2
7269fe9 (last visited Jan. 11, 2013) (reporting that Winters has been cited to 1,518 times).
105. Winters, 207 U.S. 564.
106. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
107. Arizona, 373 U.S. 546.
108. Id. at 551.
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decision was based partly on "the meaning and the scope" of a piece of legislation
Congress enacted - the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928.109 This Act of Congress
enabled numerous public works projects, including what would become known as the
Hoover Dam, and implicated the water rights of several states and several Tribal Nations
with federally established Indian reservations.I 10
The Court, when ruling on the Tribal Nations' Colorado River water rights, cited
the Winters decision and upheld its ruling, stating that when the United States created an
Indian Reservation, it "intended to deal fairly with the Indians by reserving" enough
water to fulfill the purpose of their reservation. 1 11 The Arizona Court expanded the
Winters doctrine by stating that the amount of water reserved for the Indians "was
intended to satisfy the future as well as the present needs of the Indian Reservations." 11 2
Additionally, the Court stated that "enough water was reserved [to the Indians] to irrigate
all the practicably irrigable acreage on the reservations., 113 Those needs, according to
the Court, could be reasonably calculated by measuring how much water it would take to
irrigate the entire reservation. 114 The Arizona Court reasoned: "How many Indians there
will be and what their future needs will be can only be guessed. We have concluded ...
that the only feasible and fair way by which reserved water for the reservations can be
measured is irrigable acreage." 115
C.

Cappaert v. United States: The Supreme Court FurtherExpands the Winters
Doctrine

The Supreme Court further expanded the Winters doctrine in Cappaert v. United
States in 1976, over sixty years after the Court made its ruling in Winters.116 Although
the Cappaert case did not address tribal water rights, it dealt with applying the reserved
right doctrine to groundwater as a case of first impression.117 The United States brought
suit against Cappaert because his pumping of groundwater was causing the water level of
a pool, called Devil's Hole, to drop.118 The United States claimed that President Truman
protected Devil's Hole when he withdrew the land surrounding it from the public domain
and made it a detached portion of the Death Valley National Monument. 1 19 The United
States argued that the purpose of the reservation of the lands was to protect the pool of
water and included an implied reservation of the water necessary to fulfill that purpose,
which was the protection and preservation of the pool. 120

109. Id. at 552; Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, 45 Stat. 1057, ch. 42, 43 U.S.C.A. § 617 (2012)
[hereinafter Boulder Canyon Act].
110. See Boulder Canyon Act, supra note 109.
111. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600.
112. Id.at600.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 600-01.
115. Id. at 601.
116. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
117. Id. at 142.
118. Id. at 134-36.
119. Id. at 131; Proclamation No. 2961, 17 Fed. Reg. 691 (Jan. 17, 1952).
120. Cappaert,42 U.S. at 139.
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The Court analyzed President Truman's Proclamation, which contained specific
language explaining the Proclamation's intention to give the pool special protection in an
attempt to preserve it for future generations.121 The Court reasoned that because the pool
is a body of water, "[T]he protection contemplated [by the Proclamation] is meaningful
only if the water remains." 1 22 Thus, the water, be it groundwater or surface water, was
explicitly reserved.123 While this case does not involve treaties with Tribal Nations, it
certainly supports the assertion that the Winters doctrine of reserved water rights is
expandable where such expansion is required to fulfill the purpose of federally reserved
lands. 124
IV.

A.

Two OKLAHOMA CASES THAT SUPPORT THE TRIBAL NATION CLAIMS

Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma (The Arkansas River Bank Case)

The district court presiding over Chickasaw Nation v. Fallin must decide whether
the Tribal Nations have rights to the waters in Sardis Reservoir - waters that were not
expressly mentioned in the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek.125 The decision in Choctaw
Nation v. Oklahoma ("Arkansas River Bank") is pivotal in determining the outcome of
Chickasaw Nation v. Fallin.126 Whereas the cases previously discussed in this article
illustrate the reserved Indian water right, Arkansas River Bank focuses more on the
power of the treaty and the policy behind its enforcement. 12 7 The U.S. Supreme Court,
which made the ultimate determination in Arkansas River Bank, ruled that the plaintiff
Tribal Nations did in fact have rights to the beds and banks of the Arkansas River,
despite those rights not being mentioned in the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek.128 The
Choctaw Nation Court carefully considered the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek and
relied on the provisions, intended purpose, and authority of the agreement in ruling in
favor of the Tribal Nations. 129 The Cherokee Nation originally commenced this action
against the State of Oklahoma to recover certain royalties for minerals discovered upon
130
The Choctaw and
and beneath the watercourse known as the Arkansas River.
Chickasaw Nations intervened in the action, claiming "that part of the riverbed [in
dispute] belong[ed] to them." 1 3 1 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
132
The Tenth
Oklahoma ruled in favor of the State and the Tribal Nations appealed.
121. Id. at 140-41.
122. Id. at 140.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, supra note 31.
126. Choctaw Nation v. United States, 397 U.S. 620 (1920); see also Chickasaw Nation Complaint, supra
note 4. The similarities between these two cases are remarkable, as this article demonstrates.
127. See Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. 620.
128. Id. at 635.
129. Id. at 634-36.
130. Id. at 621. The Cherokee Nation also commenced this lawsuit against various corporations to recover
royalties from mineral leases on land underlying the Arkansas River. The facts of the case do not indicate the
names of these corporations, however, and they are of no significance in the discussion of this article.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 621-22.
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Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.1 33
The Tenth Circuit decided that the Tribal Nation's claims were based on "inference
and implication."' 34 The court recounted its understanding that treaties with Indian
Tribes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians.1 35 However, the court held
more prominent the rule that the sovereign conveys nothing within a grant by implication
- in other words, a sovereign nation must specify anything it wishes to convey or else
there is no conveyance. 136 The court's decision reflected its reliance on this rule, for
there was no express language granting the Tribes rights to any part of the beds or banks
of the Arkansas River in the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek. 137 Upholding the district
court's judgment, the circuit court held that title to the beds and banks of the Arkansas
River was not part of the Tribal Nations' treaty lands, but lawfully conveyed to the State
of Oklahoma upon its admission to the Union in 1907, when the United States conveyed
the title under the Equal Footing Doctrine.138
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the Tribal Nation's case 1 39 and
reversed the circuit court's ruling, deciding in favor of the Tribes. 140 Justice John
Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court, stating the Court's conclusion that the
United States intended and did in fact convey in the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek title
to the beds and banks of that portion of the Arkansas River that flow within the metes
and bounds of the Tribal Nation's treaty lands.141 Since the Tribal Nations identified the
Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek as the treaty that conveyed to them the rights to the beds
and banks of the Arkansas River, the Court paid special attention to the history of events
that led up to the Treaty. 142 The Court recognized that the early "clash between the
obligation of the United States to protect Indian property rights on the one hand and the
policy of forcing their relinquishment on the other was inevitable."143 The Court asserted
that "[w]ith the passage of the Indian Removal Act of 1830, it became apparent that
policy, not obligation, would prevail." 1 44 The impending Indian Removal Act was the
threat that prompted the Tribal Nations in this case to agree to leave their homes in 1830
and sign the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, which granted them the land on which they

133. See Cherokee Nation or Tribe of Indians in Okla. v. Oklahoma, 402 F.2d 739 (10th Cir. 1968) rev'd sub
nom. Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. 620.
134. Id at 748.
135. Id at 747.
136. Id; accord Caldwell v. United States, 250 U.S. 14, 20 (1919); Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Soderberg,
188 U.S. 526, 534 (1903).
137. Cherokee Nation, 402 F.2d. at 747.
138. Id. at 745 (stating that "Oklahoma was admitted to the Union on an equal footing as the original states"
and that "the equal footing principal must be recognized and maintained").
139. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 394 U.S. 972 (1969) (petitions for writs of certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit).
140. Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 635-36 ("We thus conclude that the United States intended to and did
convey title to the bed of the Arkansas River.
141. Id
142. Id. at 622 ("As background, it is necessary briefly to relate the circumstances by which petitioners
received large grants of land by treaty from the United States.").
143. Id. at 625.
144. Id.
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live today - the land that the Arkansas River runs through. 145
The Court also took a hard look at the language and purpose of the agreement in
accordance with the Canons of Construction. 14 6 The ruling of the Court reflected its
interpretation of the provisions of the treaty, as well as its understanding of the treaty's
purpose.1 47 The Court concluded that the United States did, in fact, intend to convey to
the Tribal Nations the rights to the bed and banks of the Arkansas River, and that the
Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek effectively made that conveyance despite its lack of
specific language.14 8
1.

Government Policy Over Legal Obligation

The Arkansas River Bank Court, in its retracing of the history of treatment of
Tribal Nations by the United States, made a very clear and definite assertion: the United
States has a track record of promoting policy that supported its current interests rather
than upholding agreements and fulfilling obligations that may not have furthered those
interests. 149 The Court seemed to go out of its way to underscore the past injustices that
the Tribes experienced - making specific reference to the United States' concerted
effort to manipulate and abuse its relationship with the Tribes in its policy to further
expand the settlement of the continent. 150
The Court, in this case, made its first remark regarding the United States' choosing
to promote policy favorable to the expansion of the settlers rather than upholding its
"solemn guarantee" to the Tribal Nations, to which it reserved land for shortly after the
Revolutionary War.151 The United States made the Louisiana Purchase shortly after
making these "solemn guarantees" to the Indians and immediately proposed that the
Tribes pick up and relocate to lands even further west; 152 the purchase expanded the
United States' territory vastly in that direction and made available larger eastern portions
for the expansion of settlers. 153
The Arkansas River Bank Court cited to the Indian Removal Act of 1830 as the
mechanism which forced the involuntary removal of the Tribal Nations only a few years
after they had been solemnly guaranteed through various treaties that they would have a

145. Id.
146. Id. at 630.
147. Id. at 635.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 623, 625.
150. Id. at 623-28.
151. Id. at 622-23. After the Revolutionary War, the United States made a series of treaties with the
Cherokee and Choctaw Nations assigning them the right to lands for their "exclusive use and occupancy." See
id. (citations omitted).
152. See id.
153. See Treaty with France, art. 1,8 Stat. 200 (1803).
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new homeland to call their own. 154 The United States created The Indian Removal Act
as a policy mechanism that had the effect of completely destroying the Tribal Nations'
rights to their treaty lands. 155
The Arkansas River Bank Court noted the "clash between the obligation of the
United States to protect Indian property rights on the one hand and the policy of forcing
their relinquishment on the other." 1 56 It is impossible to say with certainty, but the Court
seemed conscience-stricken in recounting the effect of the United States' choice to
pursue policy over obligation in its consideration and analysis of the history behind the
Tribal Nations' struggle for a homeland. 157 The Court stated that the Indian Removal
Act made it "clear that the United States was unable or unwilling to prevent the States
and their citizens from violating Indian rights." 1 58 The Supreme Court's ruling reflected
its consideration of the notion of fairness and the United States' obligation to uphold its
agreements with the Tribal Nations, even if it had not done so in the past. 159
2.

Justice Douglas's Concurring Opinion

In the Arkansas River Bank case, Justice Douglas was not a part of the opinion
delivered by Justice Marshall, but rather delivered a separate concurring opinion that
pointed out an alternate reason for ruling in favor of the Choctaws.160 Justice Douglas
echoed the majority's factual recitation of the treaty granting the Tribal Nation over
14,000,000 acres of property.161 In addition, he made note of the fact that the lands
conveyed in fee simple to the Tribal Nations completely surround the segment of the
Arkansas River in dispute in the case.162
Justice Douglas exclaimed that it was a "mystery" as to why, if all the land
surrounding the segment of the Arkansas River was conveyed to the Tribal Nations in
fee simple, the bed in that portion of the river was not also conveyed.163 He made the
keen observation that the United States, in drafting the agreement with the Tribal
Nations, took special care to expressly reserve certain rights, including but not limited to
the right to "establish and maintain military posts and roads together with the free use of
land, timber, fuel, and materials for the construction and support of those facilities."164
Justice Douglas reasoned that if the United States in fact intended to withhold the rights
to the beds of the Arkansas River, then it would have so indicated in the agreement. 165
Justice Douglas concluded by stating, "[s]ince the United States made some reservations
but made no reservations of the river bed, and if fair dealing is the standard, one would
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

ChoctawNation, 397 U.S. at 623-25 (construing the Indian Removal Act of 1830, 4 Stat. 411).
Id
Id at 625.
Id. at 623, 625.
Id. at 625.
Id.
Id. at 636 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id at 637.
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conclude, I think, that the river bed was the tail that went with the hide." 1 66
B.

Tarrant v. Herrmann: When Congress Speaks, States Must Listen

The Western District Court presiding over Chickasaw v. Fallin should consider
TarrantRegional Water District v. Herrmann, a very recent Tenth Circuit decision that
bears significantly on the relationship between federal and state action. 16 7 The Tarrant
Regional Water District of Texas sued Rudolph Herrmann in his official capacity as a
member of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board ("OWRB").168 On September 7, 2011,
the Tenth Circuit affirmed the Western District of Oklahoma Court's decision in favor of
the OWRB, thereby preventing Tarrant from transferring water into Texas from
Southeastern Oklahoma. 169 The Tarrant Regional Water District, located in the northern
region of Texas and bordering Oklahoma, had applied for permits that would allow it to
transfer water from southeastern Oklahoma for use in Texas. 170 The OWRB could not
issue the permits as it violated Oklahoma state law to do so.171
In 2009, Tarrant sued for declaratory judgment to quash particular Oklahoma
172
statutes governing water appropriation and to enjoin the OWRB from enforcing them.
Tarrant argued that the Oklahoma statute making it illegal to transfer water outside the
state was a violation of the Commerce Clause because it discriminated against nonresidents. 173 The Tenth Circuit Court rejected Tarrant's arguments and ruled in favor of
Herrmann and the OWRB, concluding that an interstate compact - The Red River
Compact ("RRC") - gave Oklahoma the right to enact discriminatory legislation
preventing the transfer of water. 174 Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas entered
into the RRC, an agreement wherein each of the states to the compact came to an accord
with respect to the rights to the water of the Red River, along with its tributaries. 175 The
above-mentioned states entered into the RRC to provide an "equitable apportionment" of
the waters of the Red River and its tributaries; Congress approved and ratified the
Compact once agreed upon by the interested states. 176
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court ruled that the authority of the RRC, to which
both Oklahoma and Texas were parties, preempted Oklahoma's state statutes, and that

166. Id
167. Tarrant Reg'1 Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 656 F.3d 1222, 1250 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 80
U.S.L.W. 3453 (U.S. Jan. 4,2013) (No. 11-889).
168. Id. at 1227.
169. Id. at 1250.
170. Id. at 1227.
171. Id.
172. Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, CIV-07-0045-HE, 2009 WL 3922803 at *1 (W.D. Okla. Nov.
18, 2009), aff'd TarrantReg ' Water Dist., 656 F.3d 1222.
173. Id. at *3-4.
174. Id. at *7.
175. Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305 at Preamble (1980) ("Red River Compact") [hereinafter Red River
Compact]; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 120 (9th ed. 2009) (A compact is "an agreement or covenant between
two or more parties, [especially] between governments or states;" "[a] voluntary agreement between states
enacted into law in the participating states upon federal congressional approval.").
176. See Red River Compact, supra note 175.
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the OWRB was vindicated in exercising its right to not issue the permits. 177 The ruling
affirmed the Western District Court's decision that, with respect to the water transfer at
issue, the RRC trumped state law and that the provisions of the interstate water compact
governed the issue in favor of Oklahoma. 178 The RRC declared that each state could
control the transfer of Red River waters within its borders, and the court interpreted the
language of the Compact to give each respective state the authority to enact legislation to
that effect, even if the legislation would otherwise be an unlawful restriction of interstate
commerce. 179 The district court granted Herrmann's motion for summary judgment - a
ruling which was upheld on appeal - proclaiming that the RRC was adequate authority
to preclude the Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause claims that plaintiff asserted
and to deny it access to that water as it flowed in the Red River. 180
The RRC that controlled the transfer of water in the Tarrant case can be likened to
the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek in that both agreements were an expression of
Congress' will, and they carried the full weight of Congress' authority and intent. 18 1 The
RRC explicitly stated in its "General Provisions," under Section 2.01, that "[e]ach
Signatory State may use the water allocated to it . . . in any manner deemed beneficial by
that state" and that "[e]ach state may freely administer water rights and uses in
accordance with the laws of that state." 1 82 The RCC contains language clearly stating
that "[t]he State of Oklahoma shall have free and unrestricted use of the waterts]"
allocated to it.183
There were several reasons that both the Western District Court and the Tenth
Circuit Court ruled in favor of the RRC's authority over state matters.184 First, the
Western District Court recognized and upheld the RCC's validity and authority as
entered into by Oklahoma, Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas under the Compact
Clause. 185 The Western District Court referred to Texas v. Mexico in stating, "Once
Congress has approved an interstate compact, the compact becomes more than just an
agreement between the involved states. It also becomes, in legal effect, a federal
statute."l86 The Tarrant court, along with the interested parties, understood that the
Dormant Commerce Clause was only applicable where Congress had remained silent on
an issue relating to commerce.187 They also appreciated that when Congress takes
actions to authorize a state activity or regulation, that activity or regulation is "immune

177. Tarrant Reg'1 Water Dist., 656 F.3d at 1250.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Tarrant Reg'I Water Dist., 2009 WL 3922803 at *8.
181. See Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, supra note 31; see also Red River Compact, supra note 175.
182. Red River Compact, supra note 175, § 2.01.
183. Id. § 4.02(b).
184. TarrantReg'I Water Dist., 2009 WL 3922803 at *8; TarrantReg'i Water Dist., 656 F.3d at 1250.
185. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, §10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of
Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another
State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will
not admit of delay."); TarrantReg '1 Water Dist., 2009 WL 3922803 at *4.
186. TarrantReg 'I Water Dist., 2009 WL 3922803 at *4 (construing Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124,
128 (1987)).
187. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol48/iss2/20

18

Cox: A Reserved Right Does Not Make a Wrong
2012

A RESERVED RIGHTDOESNOTMAKEA WRONG

391

from Commerce Clause attack even if it would otherwise be contrary to 'dormant'
Commerce Clause principles."l88 The court declared that it was undisputed that
Congress ratified the RRC, and that such ratification of an interstate compact
189
transformed the agreement into a federal statute.
The district court noted that the Tarrant case seemed one of first impression for the
court, requiring it to determine whether an interstate compact such as the one at issue
190
Overall,
was sufficient to "insulate state statutes from Commerce Clause scrutiny."
the district court thoroughly supported its interpretation of the congressionally-vested
authority in the RRC.191 The Western District Court concluded that, without any
controlling authority, the only method of deciding the dispute was to interpret Congress'
intent behind the RRC, as Congress ratified and promulgated it as a federal statute. 192 In
its interpretation of the RRC, the court concluded that it preempted state law, and as
such, "the approval of the RRC by Congress necessarily constituted its consent to a legal
scheme different from that which would otherwise survive Commerce Clause
scrutiny."1 93 The Western District Court ruled in favor of Oklahoma's right to deny
Texas permits to transfer water. 194 It further ruled that the RRC, as federal law, exempts
the State of Oklahoma from Commerce Clause attack for what would otherwise be
considered unconstitutional state statutes. 195
In addition, the Tenth Circuit Court applied the ruling in Intake Water Co. v.
Yellowstone River Compact Comm'n, which held that interstate water compacts cannot
be challenged under the Dormant Commerce Clause and that a "[c]ompact cannot, by
definition, be a state law impermissibly interfering with commerce but is instead a
federal law, immune from attack." 1 96 The Tenth Circuit Court based its conclusion "on
197
It recognized
the language of the Compact itself as providing congressional consent."
authority,
state
of
scope
a
broad
of
the clear intent of the RRC and its authorization
state to
signatory
paying particular attention to the plain language authorization of each
regulate all transfer and appropriation of the waters within its state boundaries.198 The
Tenth Circuit Court upheld the District Court's decision to grant OWRB's motion for
summary judgment on the basis that the RRC in fact insulated the State of Oklahoma
from any Dormant Commerce Clause challenge insofar as the challenge applied to the
surface waters subject to the agreement as ratified by Congress. 199

188. Id.
189. Id. (construing Texas, 482 U.S. at 128).
190. Id. ("So far as the court can determine, no case has squarely addressed the question of whether
Congress' approval of compact language like that involved here is sufficient to insulate state statutes from
Commerce Clause scrutiny.").
191. Id. at*5.
192. Id.
193. Id. at *5-6.
194. Id. at *6.
195. Id. at *8.
196. Tarrant Reg'1 Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 656 F.3d 1222, 1236 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Intake Water
Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm'n, 769 F.2d 568, 570 (9th Cir. 1985)).
197. Id. at 1239.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1250.
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SARDIS RESERVOIR: FROM THE BEGINNING

In 1974, the State of Oklahoma, by and through the Oklahoma Water Conservation
and Storage Commission ("OWCSC"), contracted with the Army Corps of Engineers
("The Corps") for the construction of the dam that created the water storage facility
known as Sardis Reservoir.200 Before The Corps built the dam, the smaller body of
water that was there at the time was known as Clayton Lake.201 The OWCSC was
thereafter dissolved, and the OWRB took over its contractual obligations.202
Sardis Reservoir, referred to as Sardis Lake for recreational purposes, is located in
the southeastern corner of Oklahoma, in Pushmataha County.203 As is the case with
many of Oklahoma's lakes, The Corps created Sardis Lake by constructing a large
dam.204 Sardis Lake has ninety-two miles of shoreline and a normal pool capacity of
233,053 acre-feet 205 of water. 206 While it was built for many purposes - including
flood control, water supply, recreation, and fish and wildlife - providing a storage
facility to retain and hold water was the primary purpose behind the lake's
construction. 20 7
Oklahoma failed to honor its contract with The Corps by discontinuing payment on
its debt after the reservoir was constructed. 208 In 2009, The Corps obtained a favorable
judgment in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma
against the State of Oklahoma. 2 09 The Court decree: (a) specified the amount of the
State's default as $21,783,809, (b) provided $38,202,797 for future storage use debt
obligations, and (c) required an ongoing operation, management, and replacement
obligation of $147,200 per year. 2 10
It can be speculated that the reason that Oklahoma did not honor and fulfill its
contractual obligations with The Corps is because it did not have sufficient funds to do
so.211 On June 15, 2010, shortly after the district court rendered a judgment, the OWRB
200. United States v. Oklahoma, 184 F. App'x 701 (10th Cir. 2006). This action was brought by the United
States to affirm the remaining debt on the 1974 contract between the Army Corps and the state of Oklahoma
for the construction of Sardis Reservoir.
201. See Contract Between the United States of America and the Water Conservation Storage Commission
of the State of Oklahoma for Water Storage Space in Clayton Lake, Apr. 9, 1974 [hereinafter Dam Contract].
202. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1085.38 (1991) ("As of the effective date of this act, all existing obligations of
the Oklahoma Water Conservation Storage Commission shall be assumed by the Oklahoma Water Resources
Board.").
203. Lakes of Oklahoma, Sardis, OKLA. WATER REs. BD.,
http://www.owrb.ok.gov/news/publications/lok/lakes/Sardis.php (last visited Jan. 13, 2013).
204. See Dam Contract, supra note 201.
205. Water Use Permitting,Fact Sheet, OKLA. WATER REs. BD.,
http://www.owrb.ok.gov/about/aboutpdf/Fact-Permitting.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2013). An acre-foot of
water is a volume used in describing large sources of water. The amount of water in an acre-foot is described as
water at the height of one foot covering one acre of land. There are 325,851 gallons of water in one acre-foot.
206. OKLA. WATER REs. BD., supra note 203.
207. See Dam Contract, supra note 201.
208. United States v. Oklahoma, No. Civ-98-00521 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 3, 2009) (setting forth the times and
amounts of payments to be made under the Contract between the United States and the State of Oklahoma for
the construction of Sardis Reservoir in 1974).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. (stating that Oklahoma was refusing to make payments on its debt to the Army Corps of Engineers).
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entered into a contract ("Storage Transfer Contract") with the Oklahoma City Water
Utilities Trust (OCWUT). 2 12 In the Storage Transfer Contract, the State of Oklahoma
and the OWRB agreed to transfer all of their water storage rights in Sardis Reservoir to
OCWUT in return for OCWUT's paying off the remainder of Oklahoma and OWRB's
2 13
The Storage Transfer Contract contains
outstanding debt to the United States.
language that states OCWUT is not authorized to use any of the water in the Sardis
2 14
The OWRB acknowledged that
Reservoir unless it obtains a permit from the OWRB.
massive amount of water from
a
appropriate
to
permit
a
for
application
an
filed
OCWUT
21
the reservoir. 5
The Storage Transfer Contract contains suggestive language that tends to support
the assumption that the OWRB "acknowledges" OCWUT's application to appropriate
136,000 acre-feet of water as part of its consideration for OCWUT's assuming the debt
for the construction of Sardis Reservoir. 216 While the language in the contract is merely
suggestive of a permit to appropriate water conditioned on the agreement, an earlier draft
of the agreement contains additional provisions that further support the validity of this
assumption.217
A.

Chickasaw v. Fallin: The Fightfor the Water in SardisReservoir

In southeastern Oklahoma, push has finally come to shove over the long and
heavily-debated Sardis Reservoir and who legally holds the rights to the waters
therein.218 The Tribal Nations, who filed the lawsuit in the Western District of
Oklahoma in August of 2011, have not acted in haste; news of agonizing debate and
attempted compromise dates back to early 2010.219 The battle between the Tribes and
the respondents is anything but a late-breaking news story, and with no compromise
having been reached over the years of debate, the controversy is now up for the courts to
decide. 220

212. See Storage Contract Transfer Agreement Between Oklahoma Water Utilities Trust and State of
Oklahoma Water Resources Board, June 15, 2010.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. The transfer agreement contains very suggestive language that tends to support the assumption that
the OWRB "acknowledges" OCWUT's application to appropriate 136,000 acre-feet of water as part of its
consideration in the contract.
216. Id.
217. Draft Storage Contract Transfer Agreement between Oklahoma Water Utilities Trust and State of
Oklahoma Water Resources Board, June 3, 2010, §§ 2.5(b)(i)-(ii). This draft of the transfer agreement contract
contains sections provisioning for the approval of OCWUT's permit application to transfer water from the
Sardis Reservoir. Id. The provisions include a $15,000,000 payment from OCWUT to the OWRB "[o]n or
before the date which is thirty (30) days after OWRB approves a final order issuing a permit to OCWUT." Id.
218. Journal Record Staff, supra note 2 (displaying just the articles written in The Journal Record regarding
the Sardis Reservoir water sale dispute). The Journal Record has consistently covered the story of the Sardis
Reservoir dispute, and while the source may not necessarily be relied on as completely accurate or scholarly
material, it does do an excellent job of tracking the progress of the dispute.
219. Id.
220. See Chickasaw Nation Complaint, supra note 4.
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On August 8, 2011, the Chickasaw and the Choctaw Nations jointly filed a
complaint in the Western District Court.221 Both of the plaintiffs are federally
recognized Tribal Nations that have lawful rights to lands in the State of Oklahoma. 2 22
Each of the named defendants to the lawsuit is an employee of the State in some
capacity, most of whom hold or have held positions on the OWRB.223 Additional
defendants include Mary Fallin, in her official capacity as the Governor of the State of
Oklahoma, Oklahoma City, as "an Oklahoma municipal corporation," and the OCWUT
in its capacity as "a public trust for the benefit of the City of Oklahoma City." 224
The Tribal Nations' complaint seeks "declaratory and injunctive relief to protect
their federal rights - including their present and future use water rights, regulatory
authority over water resources, and right to be immune from state law and
jurisdiction.'225 The present and future water rights the Tribes are asking the court to
grant declaratory and injunctive protections include, among others,226 the Sardis
Reservoir. 227
The injunctive relief sought by the Tribal Nations would prevent the OWRB from
selling its rights to the water in Sardis Reservoir, if in fact the court finds any such rights
to be in existence, to the OCWUT. 228 The rights in controversy pertain to the authority
to permit waters of the Kiamichi Basin to be stored in the Sardis Reservoir, as well as to
control the withdrawals of water from Sardis Reservoir.229 Further, the Tribal Nations
assert that the language of the agreement entered into between the OWRB and the
OCWUT manifests an intention "to issue a water-use permit that grants the [Oklahoma
City Water Utility] Trust the right to annually withdraw water from the Sardis Reservoir
and/or Kiamichi Basin in an amount equal to roughly ninety percent (90%) of Sardis's
estimated sustainable yield." 230
The Tribal Nations claim that they depend on the waters in Sardis Reservoir, and
on the rest of their treaty lands, "to fulfill the homeland purposes for which that territory
was set aside under the [Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek]."231 The Tribal Nation's claim
that the water is necessary and used to fulfill various purposes, including "protecting and
221. Id.
222. See Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, supra note 31.
223. Chickasaw Nation Complaint, supra note 4 (listing Defendants as "(1) Mary FALLIN, in her official
capacity as Governor of the State of Oklahoma; (2) Rudolf John Herrmann, (3) Tom Buchanan, (4) Linda
Lambert, (5) Ford Drummond, (6) Ed Fite, (7) Marilyn Feaver, (8) Kenneth K. Knowles, (9) Richard
Sevenoaks, and (10) Joe Taron, each in her or his official capacity as a member of the Oklahoma Water
Resources Board; (11) J.D. Strong, Executive Director of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board in his official
capacity; (12) City of Oklahoma City, an Oklahoma municipal corporation; (13) Oklahoma City Water Utility
Trust, a public trust for the benefit of the City of Oklahoma City").
224. Id.
225. Id. at para. 1.
226. Id. at para. 2 ("These water resources include, inter alia, those stored in Sardis Reservoir, a federal
water storage facility, and Atoka Lake, a non-federal water storage facility, as well as the free flowing waters
of the Kiamichi Basin, Clear Boggy Basin, and the other river systems located within the Treat Territory.").
227. Id.
228. Id. at paras. 1-7.
229. Id. at paras. 3-4 (referring to the "Storage Contract Transfer Agreement Between Oklahoma City Water
Utilities Trust and State of Oklahoma Water Resources Board").
230. Id at para. 3.
231. Id at para. 36.
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enhancing the environmental quality and productivity of the Treaty Territory lands,
waters, and natural and cultural resources, pursuing economic self-sufficiency, and
meeting the growing needs of their communities." 232
The Tribal Nations assert that State officials have recognized their rights to the
water in Sardis Reservoir in the past. 2 33 Further, the State has implicitly recognized their
rights in attempting to seek their participation in various negotiations regarding interstate
transactions involving Kiamichi Basin waters, some of which are the same waters that
are stored in Sardis Reservoir.234 However, none of these negotiations resulted in any
form of finalized agreement. 2 35
The Tribal Nations contend that the State of Oklahoma and the OWRB are
ignoring their rights to the water in Sardis Reservoir - rights granted to them in the
Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek.236 They claim that allowing the transfer of Sardis
Reservoir water storage rights and the issuance of permits to withdraw and export water
from the reservoir jeopardizes the future prosperity of their treaty lands and their ability
to protect their federal rights from state action. 237 Their primary prayer for relief is that
the court issue an injunction to stop the transfer of the storage rights and issuance of any
withdrawal permits "unless and until a comprehensive adjudication of water rights" has
been conducted. 23 8 A "comprehensive adjudication of water rights," as provided for by
the McCarran Amendment, requires that anyone who claims to have a right to water
from a particular source (e.g. a reservoir, stream, etc.) must become a party to the action
and have that right adjudicated in a court of law. 239 The Tribal Nations assert that
because the State of Oklahoma and the OWRB have refused to conduct meaningful
negotiations with them to sort out fair apportionment of the rights to the water in Sardis
Reservoir, they are left no choice but to file a lawsuit and force an adjudication of all
rights to the water so that their rights will be quantified, declared, and protected by
law. 24 0
VI.

ANALYSIS

The Western District Court's interpretation of the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek
is critical to the outcome of Chickasaw Nation v. Fallin.241 The Winters, Arizona, and
Arkansas River Bank cases all prove that even if treaties between the United States and
Tribal Nations do not expressly mention certain rights, those rights are still often

232. Id.
233. Id. at para. 44.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at para. 1.
237. Id. at para. 4.
238. Id. at para. 73.
239. See generally Michael D. White, McCarron Amendment Adjudications - Problems, Solutions,
Alternatives, 22 LAND & WATER L. REv. 619 (1987) for a more detailed description of the McCarran
Amendment.
240. Chickasaw Nation Complaint, supra note 4, at paras. 64-71.
241. Id.
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impliedly reserved with the land to fulfill the purpose of the treaty.242 The Treaty of
Dancing Rabbit Creek does not expressly provide for the Tribal Nations' reserved rights
to water; however, if the Western District Court follows the Supreme Court's example,
an implied right should be found and the Tribal Nations' rights recognized. 24 3
If the Chickasaw Nation v. Fallin court properly interprets the Treaty of Dancing
Rabbit Creek, it will have a clear understanding of the intention of the treaty and the
purpose of the grants therein.244 The Western District Court's appreciation of the
purpose of the land grant to the Tribal Nations will enable it to find that there was in fact
an impliedly reserved water right attached to the land.245 The Winters case clearly
establishes the fact that the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations have reserved rights to the
waters in the Sardis Reservoir. 246 The Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek clearly spelled
out the purpose of the land granted to the Tribal Nations.247 The Winters doctrine
effectively establishes that the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations are entitled to enough
water to fulfill the present and future purpose of their treaty lands and supports the
contention that none of the water from their land should be transferred or sold until their
rights are formally recognized and adequately quantified. 24 8
The Arizona Court's use of the "practicably irrigable acre" was landmark in
establishing a reserved right for future water use.249 The Arizona case further proves that
the Tribal Nations in Chickasaw Nation v. Fallin have at the very least rights to enough
water to irrigate all the land granted to them in the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek. 250
However, irrigation is not the primary purpose of the Tribes' land today and they have
asserted that they have a far greater need and economic interest in being able to protect
their rights to the waters impliedly reserved in the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek. 25 1
Because reserved water rights do not diminish with nonuse and they are reserved for the
current and future purposes of the Tribal Nations, the rights remain with the Tribal
Nations in perpetuity and should be no less than the amount required to irrigate the
original treaty lands. 2 52
The Cappaert Court expanded the Winters doctrine to include groundwater and
further proved that the reserved water right is not set in stone and is flexible with the
needs of justice.253 Although the Cappaertcase did not involve Tribal Nations or their
treaties, its ruling should compel the Western District Court deciding Chickasaw Nation
254
v. Fallin to consider the ultimate purpose of the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek2.
The
242. See Choctaw Nation v. United States, 397 U.S. 620 (1970); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963);
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
243. Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, supra note 31; Chickasaw Nation Complaint, supra note 4.
244. See Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, supra note 31; Chickasaw Nation Complaint, supranote 4.
245. See Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, supra note 31; Chickasaw Nation Complaint, supranote 4.
246. See Winters, 207 U.S. 564.
247. See Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, supra note 31.
248. See Winters, 207 U.S. 564.
249. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
250. Id.; Chickasaw Nation Complaint, supra note 4.
251. Chickasaw Nation Complaint, supra note 4, at para. 36.
252. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
253. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976).
254. Id.
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facts of the Chickasaw v. Fallin case can be directly imputed into the analysis the
Cappaert Court used to arrive at its decision. 25 5 The purpose of the Treaty of Dancing
Rabbit Creek was to provide the Tribal Nations with land that they could make into a
permanent home. 256 This permanent homeland was meant to be exclusively controlled
by the Tribal Nations without interference from any state or government. 257 Thus to
fulfill this purpose, the water, be it in a stream, lake, or reservoir, is impliedly reserved
for the Tribal Nations so that they may continue to fulfill the purposes of their federally
granted treaty land, govern and protect their property, and remain permanently on the
lands without being forced to relinquish essential resources that make the land a
permanent place to live and conduct business. 258
The Supreme Court's ruling in the Arkansas River Bank case may provide the
clearest guidance for the Western District Court presiding over Chickasaw Nation v.
259
Chickasaw
Fallin because both cases involve the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek.
Nation v. Fallin requires the Western District Court to examine the same exact treaty
used by the Supreme Court to determine the outcome of the Arkansas River Bank
case.260 The Arkansas River Bank Court stated that treaties such as the Treaty of
Dancing Rabbit Creek "are not to be considered as exercises in ordinary
conveyancing." 26 1 The Court recognized that the Indians did not initiate these treaties
with the U.S. government, but rather the United States imposed the treaties on the
Indians with hardly a choice but to consent. 262 The fact that the Supreme Court
interpreted the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek in favor of the Tribal Nations is
confirmation of the Western District Court's responsibility to view the Treaty in the light
most favorable to the Tribal Nations in determining their rights to the water in Sardis
Reservoir.263
The Chickasaw Nation v. Fallin court should be compelled to consider the past
treatment of the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations and follow in the footsteps of the
Arkansas River Bank Court in upholding the promises made by the United States in the
Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek. 264 The Court discussed the "clash between the
obligation of the United States to protect Indian property rights on one hand and the
policy of forcing their relinquishment on the other." 2 65 The Chickasaw Nation v. Fallin

255. Id.
256. See id.; Choctaw Nation v. United States, 397 U.S. 620 (1970): Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546
(1963); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
257. Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, supra note 31.
258. Id.
259. Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 630-32; Chickasaw Nation Complaint, supra note 4.
260. See Chickasaw Nation Complaint, supra note 4.
261. Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 630-31.
262. Id.
263. Id The concept of interpreting Indian treaties in a light most favorable to the Tribal Nation was
expressed in Winters and has been the standard for interpreting such treaties since the Winters ruling. This
article simply asserts that the Western District Court presiding over Chickasaw v. Fallin must not stray from
the standard and should be compelled by the Arkansas River Bank decision to consider the waters in Sardis
Reservoir in the same manner the Arkansas River Bank Court considered the banks of the river.
264. Id. at 625.
265. Id.
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court has the opportunity here to avoid the clash between obligation and policy by
upholding the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek and granting the Tribal Nations' request
for an injunction so their water rights can be quantified before the State of Oklahoma and
the OWRB issue permits to transfer large amounts of water from off their treaty land. 26 6
Justice Douglas's analogy - made in his concurring opinion in the Arkansas River
Bank case - supports the reserved water rights established by Winters and its progeny,
which in turn supports the Tribal Nations' claims in Chickasaw v. Fallin.267 Justice
Douglas's analogy also speaks to the principle of "fair dealing" and points out that
unilaterally altering material terms of an agreement after it has been agreed upon is
contrary to the standard of fair dealing.268 The State of Oklahoma is attempting to do
just that with respect to the Tribal Nations' water rights in attempting to sell and transfer
the water without regard to the rights granted to Tribal Nations in the Treaty of Dancing
Rabbit Creek. 2 69 The Treaty gave the Tribal Nations absolute and exclusive use of the
land without ever mentioning a single provision regarding the United States' intent or
desire to withhold certain waters.270 Justice Douglas would agree that in the case of
Sardis Reservoir, the waters therein are merely "the tail that went with the hide." 27 1
The Winters, Arizona, and Arkansas River Bank decisions were largely decided
based on the Court's interpretation of the purpose and the authority of the Treaty of
Dancing Rabbit Creek. 272 Moreover, the district court presiding over Chickasaw v.
Fallin should consider the decision in Tarrant as not merely persuasive, but
controlling.273 The Tarrant court held that the authority vested in the interstate water
compact was controlling over the interstate dispute because it was the express will of
Congress and carried with it the force of a federal mandate.274 The Chickasaw Nation v.
Fallin court should find the intention of the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek clearly
reserves the lands and waters for the Tribal Nations.275 Congress ratified the Treaty of
Dancing Rabbit Creek in 1830 and the Treaty continues to carry with it the full force of
Congress' authority over state matters.276 While the Treaty is not as old as the U.S.
Constitution, it is still a direct expression of Congress' will and the "supreme law of the
land," which certainly gives it authority over state action. 27 7

266. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. 620; Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
267. Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 637 (Douglas, J., concurring); Chickasaw Nation Complaint, supranote 4.
268. Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 637 (Douglas, J., concurring).
269. See Chickasaw Nation Complaint, supra note 4.
270. Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, supra note 31.
271. Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 637 (Douglas, J., concurring).
272. See Cappaert United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. 620; Arizona v. California,
373 U.S. 546 (1963); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
273. Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 656 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2011); Chickasaw Nation Complaint,
supra note 4.
274. TarrantReg'i Water Dist., 656 F.3d at 1236.
275. Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, supranote 31.
276. Id.
277. Id.; Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 519 (1832).
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VII. CONCLUSION

The Winters, Arizona, and Cappaert cases make obvious the Supreme Court's
acknowledgment and enforcement of the reserved water right, establishing the fact that
the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations do in fact have lawful rights to the water in Sardis
Reservoir.278 The Arkansas River Bank case demonstrates the Supreme Court's
appreciation of the hardships that Tribal Nations have been forced to endure and the
devastatingly unfair policy that they have been subject to over the course of this nation's
history.279 All of the cases discussed in this article tend to prove that when Congress and
the U.S. government act - by way of treaty, compact, or otherwise - no state of the
union may act in contravention, and the will and intention of the United States must be
upheld.
The Western District Court presiding over Chickasaw Nation v. Fallin has ample
guidance for deciding whether the Tribal Nations have a legal right to the water in Sardis
Reservoir.280 The outcome of this case is extremely important to the Tribal Nations that
commenced the lawsuit and the court's decision will have a profound effect on their along with all other Tribal Nations' - ability to protect valuable interests and rights
going into the future.281 The cases discussed in this article are not exhaustive of the
controlling and persuasive authorities that should be used by the court to make its
decision; rather, the material discussed here is meant to demonstrate the overwhelming
strength of authority that does exists. For the reasons presented in this article, it is firmly
predicted that the Western District Court will enjoin the State of Oklahoma and the
OWRB from selling or transferring rights to the water in the Sardis Reservoir - along
with any other source of water on the Tribal Nations' treaty land - until the Tribal
Nations have had their water rights, no matter how large or small, formally recognized,
legally protected, and adequately quantified.

-Wyatt

M. Cox

278. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963);
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
279. Choctaw Nation v. United States, 397 U.S. 620 (1970).
280. See Chickasaw Nation Complaint, supra note 4.
28 1. Id.
* The author wishes to thank Jason Aamodt and Krystina Hollarn-Phillips of The Aamodt Law Firm, as
well as Shannon Holman, for their invaluable guidance and support on this project.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2012

27

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 48 [2012], Iss. 2, Art. 20

&

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol48/iss2/20

28

